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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1904 
___________ 
 
STANLEY J. CATERBONE, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, also known as NSA; DEFENSE ADVANCED 
RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, also known as DARPA; DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE; DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, also known as DIA; CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, also known as CIA; FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, also known as FBI; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE; UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL; PENNSYLVANIA STATE 
POLICE;  PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL; LANCASTER COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS; LANCASTER COUNTY CRISIS INTERVENTION;  
LANCASTER COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT; LANCASTER MAYOR 
RICHARD GRAY; LANCASTER CITY BUREAU OF POLICE;  DETECTIVE 
CLARK BEARINGER, LANCASTER CITY BUREAU OF POLICE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 5-17-cv-00867) 
District Judge:  Honorable Edward G. Smith 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect; Possible Dismissal 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third 
Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 10, 2017 
 
Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, Jr., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion Filed: October 13, 2017) 
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_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Stanley J. Caterbone, a self-described “victim of U.S. sponsored mind control and 
cointelpro harassment program,” appeals from the dismissal of his complaint by the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  We will dismiss 
this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 
 We first consider our jurisdiction to consider this appeal.  The District Court 
dismissed most of Caterbone’s claims with prejudice, but it dismissed others without 
prejudice, allowing Caterbone 30 days in which to file a second amended complaint 
concerning events surrounding his involuntary commitments in July 2015 and February 
2016.  Dkt. ##5, 6.1  We have jurisdiction to consider final orders.  Thus, we generally do 
not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an order where any of the claims have 
been dismissed without prejudice.  See Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 
(3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  But because Caterbone did not file a second amended 
complaint within the time that the District Court allowed, the dismissal of his claims 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 The Court also dismissed without prejudice claims surrounding an incident occurring on 
March 8, 2016, in Maryland, but allowed Caterbone to file a complaint as to that incident 
only in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.  Id. 
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without prejudice has become final.  See Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1992).   
 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), we must dismiss any action that “lacks an 
arguable basis either in law or in fact.”  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).  
We agree with the District Court that the claims of the amended complaint that were 
dismissed with prejudice consisted of rambling and vague allegations that lacked any 
arguable basis in fact.  And to the extent any of the allegations were grounded in reality, 
those claims failed for the other reasons given by the District Court:  (1) the complaint 
failed to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as it lacked “a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”; (2) there is 
no private right of action under the criminal statutes that Caterbone cites; (3) he 
attempted to sue entities that are immune to suit, such as federal agencies and the 
Pennsylvania State Police; and (4) many of his claims are barred by the two-year statute 
of limitations for civil rights claims.  See Dkt. #5.  As for the claims that were dismissed 
without prejudice, we agree with the District Court that those claims were also deficient.2   
                                              
2 While certain claims regarding the incident in Maryland might have been brought in the 
District Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1), we agree with it that those allegations, and the 
ones regarding Caterbone’s involuntary psychiatric commitments in July 2015 and 
February 2016, were conclusory and that they failed to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted.  See Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 193 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (to survive dismissal, complaint must have 
“sufficient factual matter[,] accepted as true[,] to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
[its] face”). 
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 Caterbone’s motion for reconsideration also lacked merit.  See Lazardis v. 
Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  Because the motion did not 
raise any new law or new evidence, and failed to point out any error in the District 
Court’s original decision that would require reconsideration, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the motion.3    
 Similarly, Caterbone’s notice of appeal and the document that he filed in support 
of this appeal do not give any reasons why the District Court’s dismissal was in error.  
Rather, the documents simply repeat fantastical allegations from his amended complaint 
and add other similarly improbable allegations.  We thus will dismiss the appeal.4 
                                              
3 Instead, Caterbone claimed that the District court had intentionally confused the matter 
with two earlier cases and that the assignment of the matter to Judge Smith “must be 
reviewed.”  He concluded with a rambling discourse that appears to argue that the matter 
before the District Court was not a “complaint” but was instead a [motion for a] 
“preliminary injunction for emergency relief” and that it was meant to be a continuation 
of a complaint he filed in 2016.  Caterbone’s contentions do not adequately call into 
question the District Court’s decision to dismiss the amended complaint. 
  
4 Caterbone’s Motion by Appellant for Leave to File an Overlength Argument in Support 
of the Appeal (ten pages instead of five) is GRANTED, as the document is not 
excessively long.  However, Caterbone’s Motion for Leave to File Exhibits to Argument 
in Support of the Appeal, his Motion for Leave to Lodge Exhibit “The Torture Memo” 
(submitted on flash drives, as directed by the Clerk), and his Motion to file Exhibit “NSA 
Whistleblower William Binney Affidavit July 11, 2017,” are all DENIED.  The proposed 
exhibits do not have any bearing on the propriety of the District Court’s dismissal of his 
amended complaint.  We advise Caterbone that the filing of frivolous, voluminous 
documents may lead this Court to rescind his electronic filing privilege.  3d Cir. L.A.R. 
113.2(d) (“The clerk may terminate without notice the electronic filing privileges of any 
Filing User who abuses the system by excessive filings, either in terms of quantity or 
length.”). 
